Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1993

Cummins, Nipper & Shahid v. Utah & Veur : Brief
of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James H. Beadles; Assistant Attorney General; attorney for appellants.
Andrew B. Berry, Jr.; attorney for appellees.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, William R. Cummins, Floyd L. Nipper & Shahid v. Utah & Veur, No. 930739 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5650

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
WILLIAM R. CUMMINS,
Petitioner and Appellee,
v.
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent and Appellant.

/J ,n

r

n. v*~>n / * » *

FLOYD L. NIPPER,
Case No. 930739-CA

Petitioner and Appellee,
v.

Priority No. 15

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent and Appellant.

YUSULF ABDUL BA-ITH SHAHID,
aka; JOSEPH LEE WALKER, STEVEN
W. FOSTER; PAUL GOMEZ; JOHN F.
MAYCOCK,

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

Petitioners and Appellees,

JAN 2 0 1994

v.
FRED VAN DER VEUR, Warden,
Central Utah Correctional
Facility,

fCfyf6**a**^_.
pff

\

Mary T. Noonan
Clerk of the Court

Respondent and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM THE GRANT OF A PETITION FOR AN
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT IN
AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE
DON V. TIBBS, PRESIDING
ANDREW B. BERRY
62 West Main Street
P.O. Box 600
Moroni, Utah 84646

JAMES H. BEADLES
Assistant Attorney General
33 0 South 3 00 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 575-1600

PARTIES TO THE APPEAL
Appellants

Appellees

State of Utah
Sanpete County
Fred Van Der Veur, Warden
Central Utah Correctional
Facility

William R. Cummins
Floyd L. Nipper
Yusulf Abdul Ba-ith Shahid,
aka Joseph Lee Walker
Steven W. Foster
Paul Gomez
John F. Maycock

Represented by James H.
Beadles, Assistant Attorney
General

Represented by Andrew Berry

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

WILLIAM R. CUMMINS,
Petitioner and Appellee,
•tT

V•

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent and Appellant.

FLOYD L. NIPPER,
Petitioner and Appellee,

Case No. 930739-CA
Priority No. 15

v.
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent and Appellant.

YUSULF ABDUL BA-ITH SHAHID,
aka; JOSEPH LEE WALKER, STEVEN
W. FOSTER; PAUL GOMEZ; JOHN F.
MAYCOCK,
Petitioners and Appellees,
v.
FRED VAN DER VEUR, Warden,
Central Utah Correctional
Facility,
Respondent and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM THE GRANT OF A PETITION FOR AN
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT IN
AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE
DON V. TIBBS, PRESIDING
ANDREW B. BERRY
62 West Main Street
P.O. Box 600
Moroni, Utah 84646

JAMES H. BEADLES
Assistant Attorney General
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 575-1600

Attorney for Appellees

Attorney for Appellants

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW . 2
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

4

ARGUMENT

5

A.
B.

STATUTORY LAW DOES NOT ALLOW AN AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS'
FEES
IN
PETITIONS
FOR
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT; THEREFORE, THE TRIAL
COURT'S ORDER WAS INCORRECT AS A MATTER OF
LAW

5

Attorneys' fees can be awarded only when
specifically authorized by statute

5

Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-1 did not give the
court statutory authorization to pay
attorneys' fees in this action oecause
this action is not part of the criminal
prosecution

7

CONCLUSION

9
ADDENDA

ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT, OCTOBER 5, 1993
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

i

ADDENDUM A
. . . ADDENDUM B

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES CITED
Beal v. Turner. 22 Utah 2d 418. 454 P.2d 624 (Utah 1969)
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988)

7
.

5

Parsons v. Barnes. No. 920126 (Utah, filed January 11, 1994)

6

Stewart v. State. 830 P.2d 306 (Utah App. 1992)

2

. . . .

Termunde v. Cook. 786 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1990)
Tholen v. Sandv Citv. 849 P.2d 592 (Utah App. 1993)

2
. .

5

Preece v. House, 848 P.2d 163 (Utah App. 1993)

7

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1 (Supp. 1993)

5

Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-17 (1988)

5

Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-1 (1990)

4, 5, 7

Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-3 (1990)

2

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(g) (Supp. 1993)

2

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1990)
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B (1991) (amended 1993)

ii

2,

5
2

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

WILLIAM R. CUMMINS,
Petitioner and Appellee,
V•

STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 930739-CA

Respondent and Appellant.

Priority No. 15

FLOYD L. NIPPER,
Petitioner and Appellee,
v.
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent and Appellant.
YUSULF ABDUL BA-ITH SHAHID,
aka; JOSEPH LEE WALKER, STEVEN
W. FOSTER; PAUL GOMEZ; JOHN F.
MAYCOCK,
Petitioners and Appellees,
v.
FRED VAN DER VEUR, Warden,
Central Utah Correctional
Facility,
Respondent and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the district court's order requiring
Sanpete County and the State of Utah to each pay one-half of
1
i

appellees' attorneys' fees.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(g) (Supp.

1993) gives this Court original appellate jurisdiction over
appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought
by persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal
sentence.
ISSUE PRESENTED UPON APPEAL
Did the trial court correctly conclude, as a matter of law,
that it could award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in a
petition for an extraordinary writ?
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
A lower court's "conclusions of law are accorded no
deference but are reviewed for correctness."

Termunde v. Cook,

786 P.2d 1341, 1342 (Utah 1990) (citing Fernandez v. Cook, 783
P.2d 547 (Utah 1989); see generally Stewart v. State, 830 P.2d
306, 308 (Utah App. 1992).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The trial court's order is included in Addendum A.

The

following provisions are included in Addendum B to this brief.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-3 (1990)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1990)
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B (1991) (amended 1993)

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The petitioners are incarcerated at the Central Utah
Correctional Facility.

Appellee Nipper filed an original

petition for a writ of mandamus in the Utah Supreme Court.
Pursuant to Rule 20, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this
Court referred the case to the district court.

Appellees Cummins

and Shahid filed petitions for habeas corpus directly in the
district court.

Essentially, all three claims alleged that

constitutional rights were violated by the prison's urinalysis
testing policies and practices.

Because the petitions were

substantially similar, the trial court consolidated the cases.
On August 19, 1993, the cases came before the trial court
for an evidentiary hearing.

Pursuant to motion and stipulation,

certain of the claims were dismissed as moot and the claims
regarding William Cummins and Floyd Nipper were dismissed with
prejudice.

Appellants agreed to expunge certain disciplinary

violations and reassess their inmate classifications.

The claims

of Yusulf Abdul Ba-ith Shahid were dismissed for mootness.
On October 4, 1993, the trial court entered an order
requiring that Sanpete County and the State of Utah each pay onehalf of appellees' reasonable attorneys' fees.
attorneys' fees has not been determined.

The amount of

This appeal was

originally pursued in the Utah Supreme Court; however, that Court
poured over the matter to this Court pursuant to Rule 42, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts pertinent to this appeal are included in the
Statement of the Case.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In Utah, attorneys' fees may be awarded only if specifically
authorized by statute or by contract.

The trial court's order in

this case is improper because Utah's statutes do not allow for
the award of attorneys' fees in petitions for extraordinary
writs.
The statutes pertaining to appointment of counsel for
indigent defendants in criminal cases, Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-1
et seq. (1990), do not extend to the civil remedies contained in
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Indeed, the petitions

in this case do not even attack the convictions or sentences, but
instead allege that the practices of the prison violate
constitutional standards.
Essentially, this is a claim under the remedy known in the
common law as mandamus, which is now codified in Utah as Rule
65B(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.1
quintessentially civil in nature.

This remedy is

Its attachment to the criminal

justice system in this matter is purely incidental, arising
1

Throughout the trial court proceedings, all the parties and
the court referred to this case as a habeas corpus matter.
However, petitioner Nipper's case was originally brought as a
Petition for Emergency Writ of Mandamus before the Utah Supreme
Court. That petition specifically cited to Rule 19, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure as authority for Nipper's claims.
4

solely due to the petitioners' incarceration.

This incidental

relationship does not make mandamus a part of the criminal
prosecution.

Therefore, Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-1 does not

require either the appointment or payment of counsel.
ARGUMENT
STATUTORY LAW DOES NOT ALLOW AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS'
PEES IN PETITIONS FOR EXTRAORDINARY WRIT; THEREFORE,
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER WAS INCORRECT AS A MATTER OF
LAW.
A.

Attorneys' fees can be awarded only when
specifically authorized by statute.

The Utah Supreme Court has stated: "In Utah, attorney fees
are awardable only if authorized by statute or by contract."
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988); see
also Tholen v. Sandy City, 849 P.2d 592, 596 (Utah App. 1993).
As this Court stated in Tholen, the legislature has specifically
allowed for the payment of attorneys' fees in certain situations. 2
Tholen, 849 P.2d at 596. When a statute allows attorneys' fees,
such an award may be appropriate.

However, in the face of

legislative silence, such an award is never appropriate.
Nevertheless, the trial court awarded attorneys' fees.

Prior

precedent requires a court to deny attorneys' fees unless
specifically allowed by statute.

2

See Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1 (Supp. 1993) (liability for
writing of bad check); Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-17 (1988) (mechanics'
liens); Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1992) (actions brought in bad
faith). The trial court did not rely on any of those statutes for
its decision, nor are any of them relevant.
5

In fact, the trial court did not even purport to create a
legal justification for its order.

The court's justification was

grounded not in law, but in its view of the best policy choice.
In examining the transcripts of the two court hearings held on
this matter, it appears that the court's order arose from a
concern about the hardship that a pro bono work would impose on
the attorneys in Sanpete who are, in the court's view, eligible
to represent inmates in these matters.3

From that conclusion,

which was not based on evidentiary facts, the trial court decided
that the state was obligated to pay attorneys' fees.

(Tr. of

Hearing before Judge Don V. Tibbs, February 19, 1992, at 15).
Even assuming that the trial court accurately expressed the
policy concerns, it is inappropriate for the trial court to
disregard the law in order to implement its policy choice.

Under

our constitution, the legislature, not the judiciary, makes
policy decisions.

Thus, the trial court's concerns are best left

for legislative determination.

See Parsons v. Barnes, No.

920126, slip.op. at 21 (Utah, filed January 11, 1994).

This is a

case in which the trial court ignored the law, as interpreted
both by this Court and the Utah Supreme Court, to reach the
desired result.

3

The trial court was of the view that it could only appoint
two attorneys, specifically Andrew Berry or Paul Frishknecht,
because they were the only attorneys who resided in the area and
did not represent the government in some capacity. The court also
believed that it lacked the authority to appoint an attorney who
lived outside of Sanpete or Sevier County. (Tr. of Hearing before
Judge Don V. Tibbs, February 19, 1993, at 11-14).
6

B.

Utah Code Ann, § 77-32-1 did not give the
court statutory authorization to pay
attorneys' fees in this action because it is
not part of the criminal prosecution.

In argument before the trial court, the petitioners stated
that the payment of attorneys' fees was required by Utah Code
Ann. § 77-32-1 (1990).

That argument is incorrect.

Section 77-

32-1 requires appointment of attorneys for indigent persons in
criminal prosecutions.

As respondent's trial counsel pointed

out, however, this petition for extraordinary writ is not a
criminal prosecution.

(Tr. of Hearing before Judge Don V. Tibbs,

February 19, 1993, at 6). In Beal v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 418, 454
P.2d 624, 627 (Utah 1969), the Utah Supreme Court interpreted
section 77-32-1 to include only "matters affecting guilt or
innocence and the fairness of the trials by which those ends are
accomplished."

Included in these matters were "writs of habeas

corpus." Today, the habeas corpus action referred to in Beal is
found in Rule 65B(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.4
Although the trial court referred to this action as a writ
of habeas corpus, it was, in fact, originally filed in the Utah
Supreme Court as a petition for a writ of mandamus.

The action

brought by petitioners does not affect either guilt or innocence

4

Due to the numerous amendments to Rule 65B, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, since 1969, the fundamental distinctions between
the common law writs have been ignored. It is altogether too
common for practitioners and pro se litigants, as well as courts,
to identify mandamus actions as habeas corpus actions, and vice
versa. Unfortunately, this mislabeling invariably results in the
use of incorrect legal authority and confused case law. With
Preece v. House, 848 P.2d 163 (Utah App. 1993), however, this Court
has begun to clarify this complicated area of the law.
7

or the fairness of their trials.5

It challenges, instead, the

prison's policy for urinalysis testing of inmates and states that
the prison failed to comply with that policy.
Even though this issue is not even related to the
petitioner's guilt or innocence or the fairness of his trial,
petitioners nonetheless claim that this case is a criminal
prosecution because their incarceration results from the criminal
prosecution.6

Under that reasoning, every action brought by an

inmate against the prison would then become criminal in nature -torts, civil rights actions, malpractice lawsuits, etc. -- and
would, therefore, require appointment, and payment, of counsel.
The trial court had no legal authority upon which to justify
its order.

The trial court made a decision to award attorneys'

fees even in the absence of legal support and in the face of
prior, contrary court precedent.

The trial court appeared to

understand that its order was legally improper but it continued
on its course nevertheless, with the sole aim of forcing an

5

In essence, petitioners claim that the prison failed to
comply with the law. As stated in Rule 65B(e), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure (the modern codification of mandamus) this is a
fundamental element in a mandamus claim.
6

"They're [sic] incarcerated because they violated the law
and were found to be guilty, but have been sentenced by the Court
to serve in this facility. Violation of their rights and of their
constitutional rights necessarily flow from the conviction itself
and from the sentencing procedure itself." (Tr. of Hearing before
Judge Don V. Tibbs, March 31, 1993 at 41, Statement of Andrew
Berry, attorney for petitioners).
8

appeal and requiring this Court to issue a decision.7

As this

Court stated less than one year ago in Tholen, attorneys' fees
may be awarded only when authorized by statute.

Because no

statute authorizes attorneys' fees in writ proceedings, the trial
court's order was incorrect and must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, respondents request that this
Court reverse the trial court's order mandating Sanpete County
and the State of Utah to pay petitioners' attorneys' fees.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS A

A day of January 1994.
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General

LitJi A aJit
J^Lmes
Beadles
Tfmes H. Beadle
Assistant Attorney General

7

ff

I don't want this to go up to them and then have them [the
appellate courts] doge [sic] it. And I'm putting this on the
record. I don't want them dodging it. I want them to meet it full
on. I want them to give me some direction and give the other
District Judges in this area some direction on what we are to do .
. . ." (Tr. of Hearing before Judge Don V. Tibbs, February 19,
1993 at 18, statement by the court).
9

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the

day of January 1994, I caused to

be mailed, by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true and
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS to:
ANDREW B. BERRY
62 West Main Street
P.O. Box 6 00
Moroni, Utah 84646
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

'•2 IS

JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Utah Attorney General
KIRK TORGENSEN (4927)
DAVID M. CARLSON (5048)
Assistant Attorneys General
Attorneys for Respondent
300 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 575-1600
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ORDER
Petitioner,
vs.

Case M M

STATE

Judg*. Don

I MUM
V

J .i lil is

Respondent

JLUXD li

IliiTLR,

Petitioner,

vs.

Casf Nd

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.

inn in

YUSULF ABDUL BA-ITH SHAHID,
et. al.,
Petitioner,
Case No. 92060033
vs.
FRED VAN DER VEUR, Warden C.U.C.F.#:
Respondent.

:

On the 19th day of February, 1992, the court's order to show
cause why the State of Utah and Sanpete County should not be
required to pay the attorney fees incurred by counsel appointed
by the court to represent the petitioners in the above-referenced
cases, (which have been consolidated for trial), came on for
hearing before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs.

David M. Carlson,

Assistant Attorney General, appeared on behalf of the State of
Utah, Ross C. Blackham, Sanpete County Attorney, appeared on
behalf of Sanpete County.

Paul R. Frischnecht and Andrew B.

Berry appeared and were appointed by the court as counsel for the
petitioners herein.
After hearing argument from counsel, certain stipulations of
fact were entered into at the request of the court; these
arguments and stipulations are contained in the transcript of the
hearing, an accurate and complete copy of which is attached
hereto as "Exhibit 1" and incorporated herein by this reference.
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The court then ruled that; the State of Utah and Sanpete -----£
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WHEREFORE, II IS HEREBY ORDERED that Lhe State of Utah and
Sanpete County shall each pay one half of the reasonable attorney

3

fees incurred by counsel appointed herein in their representation
of the petitioners in Case Nos. 10004, 10018 and 92060033
r
DATED THIS

4

CERTIFITVTF *""• «._ .*
j h e r e j D y cer tify that on the l?/)^aay of August, 1993, 1
caused to be mailed an accurate anacomplete copy of the above
and foregoing ORDER postage prepaid in the United States Mail,
addressed to the following;
Paul R. Frischnecht
50 North Main Street
Manti, Utah 84642
Andrew B. Berry
62 West Main Street
Post Office Box 600
Moroni, Utah 84 64 6
Ross C" B] ackhan 1
Sanpete County Attorney
160 North Main Street
Manti, Utah 84642

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the grH~\ day of September, 1993, I
caused to be mailed an accurate and complete copy of the above
and foregoing signed ORDER postage prepaid in the United States
Mail, addressed to the following:
Paul R. Frischnecht
50 North Main Street
Manti, Utah 84642
Andrew B. Berry
62 West Main Street
Post Office Box 600
Moroni, Utah 84646
Ross C. Blackham
Sanpete County Attorney
160 North Main Street
Manti, Utah 84642
*David M. Carlson *
Assistant Attorney General
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

ADDENDUM B

77-32-1. Minimum standards provided by county for defense of indigent defendants.
The following are minimum standards to be provided by each county, city and town for the
defense of indigent persons in criminal cases in the courts and various administrative bodies of
the state:
(1) Provide counsel for every indigent person who faces the substantial probability of the
deprivation of his liberty;
(2) Afford timely representation by competent legal counsel;
(3) Provide the investigatory and other facilities necessary for a complete defense;
(4) Assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the client; and
(5) Include the taking of a first appeal of right and the prosecuting of other remedies before
or after a conviction, considered by the defending counsel to be in the interest of justice except
for other and subsequent discretionary appeals or discretionary writ proceedings.
(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company

77-^? 1 M i n i m u m sLtiitiaiflK provided |M

Minh, lnr ili:it:iisi. null IIKIIJ.H'IH defendant!-

•ie roiiovv :.L *e minn u*:i standards to be provided by each county, city and town for the
defense of indigent persons - criminal cases in the courts and various administrative bodies of
the statez counsel for
Me
; r'i
i;
deprivation »
) K*pr
*n by con.-.
coun>d;
{5) Provide tne investigatory and other t
\ for a complete defense;

(4) Assure undivided loyalty of defend cuumci iu uie client; and
(5) Include the taking of a first appeal of right and the prosecuting of other remedies before
or after a conviction, considered by the defending counsel to be in the interest of justice except
for other and subsequent discretionary appeals or discretionary writ proceedings.

(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company

77-32-3. Duties of assigned counsel - Compensation.
(1) When representing an indigent person the assigned counsel shall:
(a) Counsel and defend him at every stage of the proceeding following assignment; and
(b) Prosecute any first appeal of right or other remedies before or after conviction that he
considers to be in the interest of justice except for other and subsequent discretionary appeals
or discretionary writ proceedings.
(2) An assigned counsel shall not have the duty or power under this section to represent an
indigent defendant in any discretionary appeal or action for a discretionary writ, other than in
a meaningful first appeal of right to assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to
present his claims fairly in the context of the appellate process of this state.
(3) An assigned counsel for an indigent defendant shall be entitled to compensation upon the
approval of the district court where the original trial was held, upon a showing that the
defendant has been denied a constitutional right or that there was newly discovered evidence that
would show the defendant's innocence and that the legal services rendered by counsel were other
than that required under this act or under a separate fee arrangement and were necessary for the
indigent defendant and not for the purpose of delaying the judgment of the original trier of fact.
(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company

Rule 65B. Extraordinary relief.
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available,
a person may petition the court for extraordinary relief on any of the grounds set forth in
paragraph (b) (involving wrongful imprisonment), paragraph (c) (involving other types of
wrongful restraint on personal liberty), paragraph (d) (involving the wrongful use of public or
corporate authority) or paragraph (e) (involving the wrongful use of judicial authority and the
failure to exercise such authority). There shall be no special form of writ. The procedures in this
rule shall govern proceedings on all petitions for extraordinary relief. To the extent that this rule
does not provide special procedures, proceedings on petitions for extraordinary relief shall be
governed by the procedures set forth elsewhere in these rules.

(b) Wrongful imprisonment.
(1) Scope. Any person committed by a court to imprisonment in a state prison, other
correctional facility or county jail who asserts that the commitment resulted from a substantial
denial of rights may petition the court for relief under this paragraph. This paragraph (b) shall
govern proceedings based on claims relating to original commitments and commitments for
violation of probation or parole. This paragraph (b) shall not govern proceedings based on claims
relating to the terms or conditions of confinement.
(2) Commencement. Except for challenges to parole violation proceedings, the proceeding
shall be commenced by filing a petition, together with a copy thereof, with the clerk of the
district court in the county in which the commitment leading to confinement was issued. The
court may order a change of venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the parties or
witnesses. Petitions challenging parole violation proceedings shall be commenced by filing a
petition together with a copy thereof, with the clerk of the district court in the county in which
the petitioner is located.
(3) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the petitioner has in
relation to the legality of the commitment. Additional claims relating to the legality of the
commitment may not be raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown. The
petition shall state:
(A) the place where the petitioner is restrained;
(B) the name of the court by which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced and the
dates of proceedings in which the conviction was entered, together with the court's case number
for those proceedings, if known by the petitioner;
(C) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts on the basis of which the petitioner claims
a substantial violation of rights as the result of the commitment;

(D) whether or not the judgment of conviction or the commitment for violation of
probation or parole has been reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and caption or title of
the appellate proceeding and the results of the review;
(E) whether the legality of the commitment has already been adjudicated in any prior
post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and if so the reasons for the denial of relief in the
prior proceeding.
(4) Attachments to the petition. The petitioner shall attach to the petition affidavits, copies
of records or other evidence available to the petitioner in support of the allegations. The
petitioner shall also attach to the petition a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any
prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the commitment,
and a copy of all orders and memoranda of the court. If copies of pertinent pleadings, orders,
and memoranda are not attached, the petition shall state why they are not attached.
(5) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or
discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two
copies of which shall be filed with the petition.
(6) Assignment by the presiding judge. On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly
deliver it to the assigned judge of the court in which it is filed. Except for challenges to parole
violation proceedings, the presiding judge shall if possible assign the proceeding to the judge
who issued the commitment.
(7) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is apparent to the court
that the issues presented in the petition have already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or
if for any other reason any claim in the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall
forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on its face. The
order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the
entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or
conclusions of law.
(8) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all or part
of the petition is not frivolous on its face, the court shall designate the portions of the petition
that are not frivolous and direct the clerk to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any
memorandum by mail upon the attorney general and the county attorney.
(9) Responsive pleading. Within twenty days (plus time allowed under these rules for
service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition upon the attorney general and county
attorney, or within such other period of time as the court may allow, the attorney general or
county attorney shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition that have not
been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response upon the petitioner in accordance
with Rule 5(b). Within twenty days (plus time allowed for service by mail) after service of any
motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the
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motion. No further pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered by the court.
(10) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the proceeding for
a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. Upon motion for good cause, the court may grant
leave to either party to take discovery or to extend the date for the hearing. Prior to the hearing,
the court may order either the petitioner or the state or county to obtain any relevant transcript
or court records. The court may also order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not
be set so as to delay unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the petition. The petitioner shall
be present before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present
in court during the proceeding.
(11) Orders. If the court rules in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter an appropriate order
with respect to the validity of the challenged commitment and with respect to rearraignment,
retrial, resentencing, custody, bail or discharge. The court shall enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law, as appropriate, following any evidentiary hearing or any hearing on a
dispositive motion. Upon application of the attorney general or the county attorney, or upon its
own motion, the court may stay release of the petitioner pending appeal of its order.
(12) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under Rule 54(d),
to any party as it deems appropriate. If the petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the
proceeding, the petitioner may proceed upon an affidavit of impecuniosity, in which event the
court may direct that the costs be paid by the county in which the complainant was originally
charged.
(13) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be appealed to and
reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah in accord with the statutes
governing appeals to those courts.
(c) Other wrongful restraints on personal liberty.
(1) Scope. Except for instances governed by paragraph (b) of this rule, this paragraph (c)
shall govern all petitions claiming that a person has been wrongfully restrained of personal
liberty, and the court may grant relief appropriate under this paragraph.
(2) Commencement. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk
of the court in the district in which the petitioner is restrained or the respondent resides or in
which the alleged restraint is occurring.
(3) Contents of the petition and attachments. The petition shall contain a short, plain
statement of the facts on the basis of which the petitioner seeks relief. It shall identify the
respondent and the place where the person is restrained. It shall state the cause or pretense of
the restraint, if known by the petitioner. It shall state whether the legality of the restraint has
already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding and, if so, the reasons for the denial of relief in
the prior proceeding. The petitioner shall attach to the petition any legal process available to the
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petitioner that resulted in restraint. The petitioner shall also attach to the petition a copy of the
pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the
restraint.
(4) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or
discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two
copies of which shall be filed with the petition.
(5) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is apparent to the court
that the legality of the restraint has already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any
other reason any claim in the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith
issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on its face and the reasons
for this conclusion. The order need not state findings of fact or conclusions of law. The order
shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry
of the order of dismissal.
(6) Responsive pleadings. If the petition is not dismissed as being frivolous on its face, the
court shall direct the clerk of the court to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any
memorandum upon the respondent by mail. At the same time, the court may issue an order
directing the respondent to answer or otherwise respond to the petition, specifying a time within
which the respondent must comply. If the circumstances require, the court may also issue an
order directing the respondent to appear before the court for a hearing on the legality of the
restraint. An answer to a petition shall state plainly whether the respondent has restrained the
person alleged to have been restrained, whether the person so restrained has been transferred to
any other person, and if so, the identity of the transferee, the date of the transfer, and the reason
or authority for the transfer. Nothing in paragraph (c) shall be construed to prohibit the court
from ruling upon the petition based upon a dispositive motion.
(7) Temporary relief. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained will be removed
from the court's jurisdiction or will suffer irreparable injury before compliance with the hearing
order can be enforced, the court shall issue a warrant directing the sheriff to bring the
respondent before the court to be dealt with according to law. Pending a determination of the
petition, the court may place the person alleged to have been restrained in the custody of such
other persons as may be appropriate.
(8) Alternative service of the hearing order. If the respondent cannot be found, or if it
appears that a person other than the respondent has custody of the person alleged to be
restrained, the hearing order and any other process issued by the court may be served on the
person having custody in the manner and with the same effect as if that person had been named
as respondent in the action.
(9) Avoidance of service by respondent. If anyone having custody of the person alleged to
be restrained avoids service of the hearing order or attempts wrongfully to remove the person
from the court's jurisdiction, the sheriff shall immediately arrest the responsible person. The
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sheriff shall forthwith bring the person arrested before the court to be dealt with according to
law.
(10) Hearing or other proceedings. In the event that the court orders a hearing, the court
shall hear the matter in a summary fashion and shall render judgment accordingly. The
respondent or other person having custody shall appear with the person alleged to be restrained
or shall state the reasons for failing to do so. The court may nevertheless direct the respondent
to bring before it the person alleged to be restrained. If the petitioner waives the right to be
present at the hearing, the court shall modify the hearing order accordingly. The hearing order
shall not be disobeyed for any defect of form or any misdescription in the order or the petition,
if enough is stated to impart the meaning and intent of the proceeding to the respondent.
(d) Wrongful use of or failure to exercise public authority.
(1) Who may petition the court; security. The attorney general may, and when directed to
do so by the governor shall, petition the court for relief on the grounds enumerated in this
paragraph (d). Any person who is not required to be represented by the attorney general and
who is aggrieved or threatened by one of the acts enumerated in subparagraph (2) of this
paragraph (d) may petition the court under this paragraph (d) if (A) the person claims to be
entitled to an office unlawfully held by another or (B) if the attorney general fails to file a
petition under this paragraph after receiving notice of the person's claim. A petition filed by a
person other than the attorney general under this paragraph shall be brought in the name of the
petitioner, and the petition shall be accompanied by an undertaking with sufficient sureties to pay
any judgment for costs and damages that may be recovered against the petitioner in the
proceeding. The sureties shall be in the form for bonds on appeal provided for in Rule 73.
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where a person usurps,
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, whether civil or military, a
franchise, or an office in a corporation created by the authority of the state of Utah; (B) where
a public officer does or permits any act that results in a forfeiture of the office; (C) where
persons act as a corporation in the state of Utah without being legally incorporated; (D) where
any corporation has violated the laws of the state of Utah relating to the creation, alteration or
renewal of corporations; or (E) where any corporation has forfeited or misused its corporate
rights, privileges or franchises.
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court may require that notice
be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order
requiring the adverse party to appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may also grant
temporary relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65A.
(e) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply with duty.
(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests are threatened by any of the
acts enumerated in this paragraph (e) may petition the court for relief.
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(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where an inferior court,
administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or
abused its discretion; (B) where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person
has failed to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust or station; or (C) where
an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has refused the petitioner the use
or enjoyment of a right or office to which the petitioner is entitled.
(3)
Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court may require that
notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order
requiring the adverse party to appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may direct the
inferior court, administrative agency, officer, corporation or other person named as respondent
to deliver to the court a transcript or other record of the proceedings. The court may also grant
temporary relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65A.
(4)
Scope of review. Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in nature, the
court's review shall not extend further than to determine whether the respondent has regularly
pursued its authority.
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